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I. INTRODUCTION
No axiom is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than
that wherever the end is required, the means are authorized;
wherever a general power to do a thing is given,
every
particular power necessary for doing it, is included.1
James Madison
This government is acknowledged by all to be one of
enumerated powers. The principle, that it can exercise only
the powers granted to it, would seem too apparent to have
required to be enforced by all those arguments which it
enlightened friends, while it was depending before the
people, found it necessary to urge. That principle is now
universally admitted. But the question respecting the extent
of the powers actually granted, is perpetually arising, and will2
probably continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist.
Chief Justice John Marshall
These words, spoken by two great American patriots, describe the
difficulty of a federalist government and summarize a problem that has
plagued federal courts from the beginning of the nation: what can the
federal government do and how can it do it?3 In defending the so-called
“necessary and proper clause,” President Madison notes that
Congressional power is not strictly limited to the words directly
enunciated in the Constitution, but instead that Congress must have
implied power to implement and exercise the enumerated powers. 4 That
being said, Chief Justice Marshall’s words are profound and prophetic –
we are a government of limited power, though the scope of that power is
often undefined.5 Over time the Supreme Court has become the final
interpreter of the scope of those powers under the constraints of the
Constitution.6 Each branch of the government, however, should partake
in constitutional analysis. Occasionally, there is evidence that this
1

THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 289 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819).
3 See generally Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (discussing the general principles
of federalism).
4 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1.
5 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405.
6 See, e.g., Eric J. Segall, Why I Still Teach Marbury (and so should you): A Response
to Professor Levinson, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 573, 578-79 (2004).
2
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constitutional analysis occurs, through legislative history, presidential
veto statements, or presidential signing statements, but this evidence is
neither consistent nor transparent to the citizenry of the nation. 7 More
often than not, there is a lack of evidence that it occurs at all.
In 1996, for example, Congress passed the Defense of Marriage Act
(“DOMA”).8 DOMA § 2 declared, that no state would be required to
recognize same sex marriages simply because another state recognized
these marriages, and § 3 defined the terms “marriage” and “spouse” for
all federal law and regulation purposes.9 DOMA was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary in the House of Representatives, which
identified the two primary purposes of DOMA as “defend[ing] the
institution of traditional heterosexual marriage” and “protect[ing] the
right of the States to formulate their own public policy regarding the legal
recognition of same-sex unions.”10 The Committee did note, however,
that the legislation set forth four government interests: (1) defending and
nurturing traditional marriage; (2) defending traditional notions of
morality; (3) protecting state sovereignty and self-governance; and (4)
preserving scarce government resources.11 In analyzing the bill, the
Committee noted that it was a direct response to the impending action of
Hawaiian courts towards recognizing same-sex marriage.12 With regard
to the purposes, the Committee affirmed that the Full Faith and Credit
clause of the Constitution could result in legal issues amongst the states
that had differing definitions of marriage.13 While the Committee reports
point to the potential problems that the legislation was attempting to
avoid, nowhere in the report does it address the authority for Congress to
pass this legislation.14 Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution does not
include any power for Congress to create this type of legislation or
definition unless it falls under the Necessary and Proper Clause or the
7

See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 1 (1824) (discussing the enactment of the
Commerce Clause); The Presidential Signing Statements Act, S. 1747, 110th Cong. §§ 2(4),
2(6) (2007) (explaining reasons why courts had sporadically used presidential signing
statements as sources for interpretation); Veto of the Food, Conservation, and Energy Act,
H.R. 2419, 110th Cong. (2008) (enacted) (statement of President George W. Bush discussing
the “serious constitutional concerns” of the bill). While this statement did not outline those
concerns, it does indicate that some constitutional evaluation was done.
8 United States. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
9 Id. at 2683; Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. 3396, 104th Cong. § 3 (1996) (declaring
that “the word ‘marriage’ means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.”).
10 Defense of Marriage Act, H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 2 (1996).
11 Id. at 12.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 8.
14 Id.
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Commerce Clause.15 While the Supreme Court did not find that Congress
had exceeded its authority, it was the Court that addressed the scope of
authority, without reference to any Congressional action or statement.16
It is unclear from either the committee reports or the Supreme Court
opinion whether Congress performed any analysis related to the scope of
its power.
It is a rare event that legislation is passed by Congress outside the
scope of its authority, and then signed by the President. 17 Even so, from
the founding of our nation through the present, at least 172 pieces of
legislation that were passed by Congress and signed by the President were
later declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United
States.18 In general, the legislation has been deemed unconstitutional
either because the subject matter was outside the enumerated powers of
Congress or because the legislation was properly passed under some
constitutional authority but in violation of another provision of the
Constitution.19
This article briefly explores the legislative authority of Congress and
the President, both the nature and the scope of that authority. The article
then looks at current constitutional analysis: where, and how, it may
occur in each branch of the government. The article then reviews
legislative attempts to influence that process. Specifically, the article
looks at the Line-Item Veto Act, the Presidential Signing Statements Act,
and the Enumerated Powers Act. Finally, the paper argues that it is the
responsibility of each branch to cooperate to clarify the nature of the
constitutional authority for federal actions, and to develop a more
thoughtful and transparent analysis of legislation. This would allow the
judicial branch to interpret the scope of Congress’ powers, rather than
waste time evaluating the legislation to determine whether it has a strong
foundation in the constitution prior to addressing the scope issue when
faced with challenges to legislation.
15

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8. When the Supreme Court heard this case, it did note that
Congress had passed legitimate laws relating to marriage as it related to federal programs.
See, e.g. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
16 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2691-92, 2695.
17 LIBRARY OF CONGRESS: ACTS OF CONGRESS HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN WHOLE OR IN
PART BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, available at https://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2002/pdf/GPO-CONAN-2002-10.pdf. According to the Supreme
Court database, 14 acts not listed were declared unconstitutional between 2009-2016. See
Spaeth
et
al.,
Supreme
Court
Database
1
(2016),
available
at
http://www.supremecourtdatabase.org. A review of Supreme Court slip opinions after
Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), shows that no more acts of Congress have
been declared unconstitutional through Voisine v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2272 (2016).
18 Spaeth, supra note 17.
19 See, e.g., United States. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682 (2013).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
A. The Article I, Section 8 Powers of Congress
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants powers to Congress,
some as seemingly narrow as the power to “establish post offices and post
roads” and others as potentially broad as the power to “regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with
the Indian Tribes.”20 These enumerated powers limit Congress’ ability to
act, reserving other actions to state or local governments.21 The exact
breadth of those Congressional powers, however, is left to
interpretation.22 History has left the breadth of those enumerated powers
to the discretion of the Supreme Court of the United States, through its
power of judicial review.23
In addition to the struggle over the scope and limits of the
enumerated powers, Congress, the executive branch, and the courts have
had to evaluate what sort of power is given to Congress under the
Necessary and Proper clause.24 The final clause in Article I, Section 8
gives Congress the power “[t]o make all laws which shall be necessary
and proper for carrying into [e]xecution the foregoing [p]owers, and all
other [p]owers vested by this Constitution in the [g]overnment of the
United States, or in any [d]epartment or [o]fficer thereof.”25 This
Necessary and Proper clause has been the subject of much discussion in
legal journals over the years.26
In the 44th Federalist paper, James Madison described the public
outcry against the Necessary and Proper clause as an outcry of form over
substance.27 Madison argued that the substance of the clause, to delegate
20

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 7 (regarding the postal offices and commerce).
See U.S. CONST. amend. X.
22 See, e.g., Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 34 (discussing the breadth of national power compared
to state power); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937) (declaring that
activities with a close relationship to interstate commerce may be regulated by Congress);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942) (declaring that intrastate activities that impact
interstate commerce may be regulated); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S.
241, 355 (1964) (declaring that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a valid exercise of
Congressional commerce power despite no evidence that Congress even contemplated that as
the source of authority for the bill).
23 See infra Part II.C.
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. See generally Celestine Richards McConville, The (Not
so Dire) Future of the Necessary and Proper Power after National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 369 (2015) (discussing recent Necessary
and Proper analysis).
25 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
26 An online search through the LexisNexis found almost 1000 law review articles
containing the terms “Necessary and Proper” and “constitutional authority.”
27 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1.
21
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some unspecified but needed powers to Congress, was essential.28 He
then reasoned that any objection to the clause must be about the manner
in which the powers were delegated.29 Madison posited four possible
forms of interpretation: first, to prohibit any power not expressly
delegated (copying the Articles of Confederation and essentially
strangling Congress); second, to enumerate a complete list of powers
which might be considered necessary and proper; third, to clarify
“necessary and proper” by stating exactly what is neither necessary nor
proper; or fourth, to remain silent on the issue and leave interpretation of
Congressional power to future construction and inference.30 The basics
of Madison’s arguments were that the Necessary and Proper clause was
nothing more than an explicit grant of Congress’s legislative power under
the Constitution.31
Even so, just two years after Madison left the presidency, the
Supreme Court declared that Congress has power beyond the strict
reading of Article I, Section 8.32 In McCullough v. Maryland, the Court
upheld Congressional power to create a national bank based on its power
under the Necessary and Proper Clause to “lay and collect taxes; to
borrow money; to regulate commerce; to declare and conduct a war; and
to raise and support armies and navies.”33 In his discussion, Chief Justice
John Marshall remarked, “[a]mong the enumerated powers, we do not
find that of establishing a bank or creating a corporation. But there is no
phrase in the instrument which, like the articles of confederation,
excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that
everything granted shall be expressly and minutely described.” 34 Since
that landmark decision, the scope of the enumerated powers has been
addressed on a case-by-case, or power-by-power, basis. As such,
analyzing the extent of the powers is something that has been, and should
be, done by all three branches of government.
B. The Article I, Section 7 Powers of the President
The powers of the President and the Executive Branch are primarily
outlined in Article II of the Constitution.35 The veto power of the
President, however, does not exist in Article II of the Constitution, but

28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 1.
See McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 405-07.
Id. at 407, 411-12.
Id. at 406.
See U.S. CONST. art. II.
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instead exists in Article I, Section 7, under the powers of Congress. 36
Article I, Section 7 states:
Every bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law,
be presented to the President of the United States; if he
approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
objections to37 that House in which it shall have
originated. . .”
In the Supreme Court’s well-known “Presentment Clause” case,
Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, Chief Justice Burger
wrote that the founders of the nation believed that presentment to the
President was “so imperative that [they] took special pains to assure that
[it] could not be circumvented.”38
A plain reading of this provision would indicate that, if the President
does not approve the entire piece of legislation, he or she must veto it and
send it back to Congress to address the problematic passages within the
legislation.39 If, for example, Congress passes a spending bill that
includes provisions for a “bridge to nowhere,” and the President does not
wish to sign the bill, the President should veto the entire bill and send it
back to Congress noting the disapproval of that one provision.40
Congress then must decide to amend the bill, draft a new bill, or override
the veto with the required two-thirds of the majority.41 Supporting this
reading, President Washington specifically stated that the Presentment
Clause of Article I, Section 7, required him to either “approve all the parts

36

U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, cl. 2.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §7, cl. 2.
38 INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 946-47 (1983).
39 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 440 n.30 (1988) (citing 33 WRITINGS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON 96 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940)).
40 See Ronald D. Utt, The Bridge to Nowhere: A National Embarrassment (2005),
available at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2005/10/the-bridge-tonowhere-a-national-embarrassment. The genesis of the discussion comes from a section of a
budget bill in the 109th Congress. See, e.g., Transportation, Treasure, Housing and Urban
Development, the Judiciary, the District of Columbia, and Independent Agencies
Appropriations Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-15, § 186 (2005); Clinton, 524 U.S. at 440 n.30
(citing 33 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 96 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940)).
41
As of August 18, 2016, the most recent veto override was under President George W.
Bush. President Bush vetoed H.R. 6331, entitled, “Medicare Improvements for Patients and
Providers Act of 2008.” The bill was introduced in Congress on June 20, 2008, presented to
the President on July 10, 2008 after passing both the House and Senate. President Bush vetoed
it on July 15 and both houses of Congress voted to override the veto that same day. See, e.g.,
Actions Overview of H.R.6331, CONGRESS, available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/110thcongress/house-bill/6331/actions. In the history of the United States, only 110 of 2570 vetoes
(4.28%) have been overridden. See Summary of Bills Vetoed, SENATE, available at
http://www.senate.gov/
reference/Legislation/Vetoes/vetoCounts.htm.
37
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of a Bill, or reject it in total.”42 However, if the President signs the
legislation into law and there is a challenge to that law, then the judicial
branch enters the discussion to assess the constitutionality.
C. The Article III, Powers of the Judiciary
Article III of the Constitution established the Judicial Branch and
outlined its power to include “all [c]ases, in law and equity, arising under
this Constitution, the [l]aws of the United States, and [t]reaties made, or
which shall be made, under their [a]uthority”43 The Constitution does not
include any discussion of the judiciary’s role in interpreting federal law.
That came from an early, and very famous, Supreme Court opinion.44
In the politically charged Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John
Marshall was faced with a terrific dilemma.45 President Adams had
appointed Marbury to a federal judgeship.46 Marbury’s commission was
not delivered prior to President Adams leaving office and President
Jefferson taking office.47 Jefferson did not want the commission
delivered and, in fact, made his own judicial appointments.48 Marbury
asked the Court for a writ of mandamus; thus, forcing Jefferson’s
Secretary of State, James Madison, to deliver the commission.49 If the
Court granted the writ and Madison ignored it, then the Court had no way
to enforce the writ, thus, rendering the Court less powerful than the other
branches of government.50 At the same time, the Court wanted it known
that Madison was in violation of Marbury’s rights, quite possibly because
the members of the Court were all appointed by Adam’s political party. 51
In Marbury, Marshall was very clear that Marbury was legitimately
appointed and should receive his commission as a judge.52 Once he
established that Marbury had been wronged when denied his commission,
42 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 440 n.30 (citing 33 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 96 (J.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1940)).
43 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
44 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
45 See Symposium, Why I Do Not Teach Marbury (Except to Eastern Europeans) and
Why You Shouldn’t Either, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 573 (2003).
46 See Symposium, Marbury v. Madison and the Revolution of 1800: John Marshall, the
Mandamus Case, and the Judiciary Crisis, 1801-1803, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 291-344
(2003).
47 Id. at 292.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 289.
50 See Mark A. Graber, Legal Scholarship Symposium: The Scholarship of Sanford
Levinson: Establishing Judicial Review: Marbury and the Judicial Act of 1789, 38 TULSA L.
REV. 609, 639 (2003).
51 Id. In fact, Marshall was Adams Secretary of State when the appointments were made.
52 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 167-68 (1803).
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Marshall analyzed the constitutionality of the procedural law, passed by
Congress and signed by the President, which gave original jurisdiction to
the Supreme Court to issue a writ of mandamus.53 Marbury had asked
the Court to utilize this jurisdiction to issue the writ and force Secretary
of State Madison to deliver the commission. Justice Marshall determined
that Congress did not have authority to pass the law, because it attempted
to alter the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, a power not
granted to Congress in the Constitution.54 This original proclamation of
judicial review may be the foundation for the theory that the Legislative
Branch makes the laws, the executive branch enforces the laws, and the
judicial branch interprets the laws.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS IN THE THREE BRANCHES
The President, members of Congress, and Justices of the Supreme
Court all take oaths to support and uphold the Constitution.55 That being
the case, the members of each branch should perform a constitutional
analysis before taking any action to ensure that they are working within
the limits of their authority. Members of Congress should not introduce
legislation without first analyzing the constitutionality of the legislation.
The President should not sign legislation without some constitutional
analysis, either. The Supreme Court then has (under our current system)
the final word on whether the constitutional interpretation by the
President and Congress was correct.56 Without any input from the other
branches, the Supreme Court must analyze which provision, if any,
authorizes the federal action, and then evaluate the parameters of that
constitutional provision to determine if the action falls within the scope
of that power. If there are no challenges to federal action, the Supreme
Court never performs that analysis. Under our current system, analysis
by the legislative and executive branches is sporadic at best.
A. Congressional Analysis
At least occasionally, it is clear that Congress performs a
constitutional analysis as bills are debated and discussed. For example,
in United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court pointed to legislative

53

Id. at 174-76.
Id. at 173-76.
55 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 8; U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3; 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2016).
The words of the oaths vary, with the President’s oath being directly scripted in the
constitution and the others being scripted by statute. The essence of all the oaths is essentially
a promise to support the principles of the constitution and a faithful execution of the duties of
the office as set forth in the constitution, and perhaps even the constitutionally passed statutes.
56 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 167-68 (1803).
54
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history to demonstrate that Congress was relying on its Commerce Clause
power in passing the Violence Against Women Act.57 In Sabri v. United
States, the Court reviewed a statute passed by Congress making it a crime
to bribe officials of entities that receive a certain level of federal funds.58
Justice Souter again used legislative history to determine that Congress
intended to enact the law under its spending power in Article I, Section
8.59 In declaring the Religious Freedom Restoration Act unconstitutional
as applied to state and local governments, the Court referred to legislative
history to determine the basis for congressional authority – the Fourteenth
Amendment.60 Even when the constitutional analysis is performed and
legislative history gives some insight in to the powers contemplated by
Congress, the legislative history only gives the opinion of one or a few
members of Congress and is not the official position of the Congress.61
Still, it may provide some evidence of a constitutional analysis.
Of course once Congress passes legislation, with or without any
constitutional analysis, the legislation moves to the executive branch,
where the president then takes action.62
B. Executive Analysis
Upon receiving legislation from Congress, the President must
address the bill.63 In theory, the President receives legislation from
Congress, analyzes it for constitutionality, and signs or vetoes the bill

57

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607 (2000).
Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 602 (2004).
59 Id. at 606.
60 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (“Congress relied on its Fourteenth
Amendment enforcement power in enacting the most far reaching and substantial of RFRA’s
provisions, those which impose its requirements on the States.”). See Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, S. Rep. No. 103-11, at 13-14 (1993); H. R. Rep. No. 103-88, at 9
(1993).
61 See, e.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2805 (2008); Exxon Mobil
Corp. v. Allapath Services, 545 U.S. 546, 568-69 (2005) (“As we have repeatedly held, the
authoritative statement is the statutory text, not the legislative history or any other extrinsic
material. Extrinsic materials have a role in statutory interpretation only to the extent they
shed a reliable light on the enacting Legislature’s understanding of otherwise ambiguous
terms. Not all extrinsic materials are reliable sources of insight into legislative
understandings, however, and legislative history in particular is vulnerable to two serious
criticisms. First, legislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory.
Second, judicial reliance on legislative materials like committee reports, which are not
themselves subject to the requirements of Article I, may give unrepresentative committee
members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the incentive
to attempt strategic manipulations of legislative history to secure results they were unable to
achieve through the statutory text.”).
62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
63 Id.
58
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based on that analysis.64 Commonly, there is no indication that the
President has conducted any constitutional analysis. 65 In some
circumstances, though, evidence of this analysis appears when a
President vetoes legislation and explains constitutional concerns.66 Even
when a President demonstrates some analysis, the President is not
required to have a constitutional reason or purpose for a veto and may
veto bills for purely political reasons.67
Presidents have used
“presidential nullification” to ignore, or to direct that the Department of
Justice not enforce, provisions that they deem unconstitutional, though
there may not be evidence of constitutional concerns in these situations.68
Presidents have issued signing statements to send a message to Congress
that they are willing to sign the bill, but are not going to enforce certain
provisions that, in their analyses, are unconstitutional.69 While this may
64 See, John T. Pierpont, Jr., Checking Executive Disregard, 84 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 329,
331-32 (2010).
65 See John C. Eastman, Judicial Review Of Unenumerated Rights: Does Marbury’s
Holding Apply In A Post-Warren Court World?, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 713, 735 (2005).
Contra, Statement by President Barack Obama, Office of the Press Secretary (Mar. 11, 2009)
(stating that H.R. 1105 is “a legitimate constitutional function, and one that promotes the
value of transparency, to indicate when a bill that is presented for Presidential signature
includes provisions that are subject to well-founded constitutional objections.”), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/
Statement-from-the-President-on-the-signing-of-HR-1105/ [hereinafter Statement by
President Obama]. For more information on signing statements and their description of the
constitutionality of bills, see generally, Jeremy Seeley, How the Signing Statement Thought
it Killed the Veto; How the Veto May Have Killed the Signing Statement, 23 BYU J. PUB. L.
167 (2008); Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, Symposium: The Last Word? The
Constitutional Implications of Presidential Signing Statements: The President Signing
Statements Controversy, 16 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 11, 12 (2007). See also, e.g., Note:
Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements, 120 HARV. L. REV. 597
(2006); Todd Garvey, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., Presidential Signing Statements:
Constitutional and Institutional Implications (2012).
66 See Michael T. Crabb, “The Executive Branch Shall Construe”: The Canon of
Constitutional Avoidance and the Presidential Signing Statement, 56 KAN. L. REV. 711, 713
(2008) (discussing the Article I, Section 7 veto requirements).
67 Between the founding of the nation and August 18, 2016, Presidents have vetoed a
total of 2,571 bills. Of those, 1,066 were pocket vetoes (where the President takes no action
on the bill but cannot return it to Congress within the required 10 days because Congress is
not in session). Therefore, 1,505 bills have been vetoed by Presidents and sent back to
Congress. See History, Art, and Archives, U.S. House of Representatives, PRESIDENTIAL
VETOES, http://history.house.gov/Institution/Presidential-Vetoes/Presidential-Vetoes/. Of
those 1,505, it is not known how many were vetoed based on constitutional concerns and how
many were based on purely political reasons. Some pundits argue that several recent vetoes
were politically motivated. See, e.g., Anthea Mitchell, 10 Most Important Presidential Vetoes
in
Recent
History,
THE
CHEAT
SHEET
(Mar.
21,
2015),
http://www.cheatsheet.com/politics/10-presidential-vetoes-that-shaped-recent-americanhistory.html/?a=viewall.
68 See Pierpont, supra note 64, at 329.
69 See, e.g., Seeley, supra note 65.
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be a longstanding practice, presidents have been required to provide
Congress with a report of laws that the executive branch will not enforce
due to constitutional questions or concerns.70
There is some
disagreement in the literature as to the date of the first official signing
statement, but there is some agreement that President Monroe issued it.71
Even though signing statements have been used for a variety of reasons
during the last 200 years, they have become somewhat controversial and
often discussed in law review articles.72
Specifically, the presidential signing statement is an executive
communication to Congress about legislation.73 Signing statements may
serve many functions, including expressing gratitude to Congress for
successfully passing important legislation, criticizing Congress for not
going far enough, offering interpretations of the legislation, and
explaining how the executive branch will implement the legislation.74
Some signing statements have been used to express concerns about
constitutionality and to acknowledge that the President will not enforce
particular provisions.75 This allows the President to avoid a veto while
expressing concern about constitutionality. 76
These statements often give deference to Congress and do not
affirmatively declare that a bill is unconstitutional, but instead indicate
that the President will choose to interpret the bill and enforce the law so
that it does not infringe upon any presidential constitutional power.77 In
March 2009, President Barack Obama wrote, “it is a legitimate
constitutional function, and one that promotes the value of transparency,
to indicate when a bill that is presented for Presidential signature includes
70

28 U.S.C. § 530D (2016).
See Crabb, supra note 66, at 713 (stating that the first signing statements were in 1819
and 1822); Dolly Kefgen, Signing Statements, History and Issues, 17 THE OAKLAND J. 93, 94
(2009) (declaring 1822 as the official date of the first signing statement).
72 See Crabb, supra note 66, at 717.
73 Crabb, supra note 66.
74 See Curtis A. Bradley and Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and
Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENTARY 307, 308 (2006) (discussing the uses of signing
statements by Presidents); Kristy L. Carroll, Whose Statute Is It Anyway?: Why and How
Courts Should Use Presidential Signing Statements When Interpreting Federal Statutes, 46
CATH. U.L. REV. 475, 475-76, 489 (1997) (arguing that the historical use of signing statements
was highly symbolic and congratulatory and stating that Presidents may use signing
statements to indicate constitutional defects).
75 See Carroll, supra note 74, at 489 (stating that Presidents may use signing statements
to indicate constitutional defects).
76 See Carroll, supra note 74, at 489.
77 See Statement by President Obama, supra note 65 (President Obama declaring that “it
is a legitimate constitutional function, and one that promotes the value of transparency, to
indicate when a bill that is presented for Presidential signature includes provisions that are
subject to well-founded constitutional objections.”).
71
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provisions that are subject to well-founded constitutional objections.”78
Thus, presidential signing statements do indicate, at times, that some
constitutional analysis is occurring.
Scholars opposed to signing statements containing any indication
that parts of the law will not be enforced argue that the selective
enforcement of a signed law is a constitutional violation of the
Presentment Clause and gives the President excessive legislative
powers.79 Since as early as 1979, Congress has required the executive
branch to inform it whenever the executive branch implements a formal
or informal policy to not enforce a law.80 Federal law states that the
Attorney General of the United States shall inform Congress if any officer
of the Department of Justice establishes a policy to not enforce, not apply,
or not administer any provision of federal statute, rule, or regulation.81
Between May 8, 1979 and December 4, 2014, 114 of these so-called
530D letters have been sent to Congress from the executive branch.82
Included in this list is the February 23, 2011 letter from Attorney General
Eric Holder to Speaker of the House John Boehner informing the House
that the United States government would refrain from defending the
constitutionality of DOMA in the Windsor case.83 In that letter Attorney
General Holder states that the executive branch determined that DOMA
violated the Fifth Amendment and so the branch would not support or
defend it in court.84
Clearly, the executive constitutional analysis by courts in their
interpretation of the constitutionality of a law is an interesting and tricky
subject, and one of much debate.
C. Judicial Analysis
When the Supreme Court announced the policy or theory of judicial
review in Marbury, the Court relied heavily on the direct text of the
Constitution.85 Through the present era of the Court, Justices look to the

78

Id.
See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 74, at 478-79.
80 Letters Submitted to Congress Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §503D, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/oip/letters-submitted-congress-pursuant-28-usc-530d
[hereinafter
Letters Submitted to Congress].
81 28 U.S.C. § 530D (2002).
82 Letters Submitted to Congress, supra note 80.
83 Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney General, to The Honorable John Boehner,
Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, (Feb. 23, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/07/23/02-23-2011.pdf.
84 Id.
85 Marbury, 5 U.S. at 174-75.
79
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text as a starting point to determine constitutionality. 86 For example, in
2003, the Court decided Eldred v. Ashcroft.87 In Eldred, Congress
extended the length of copyright protection under the intellectual
property power in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.88 A number of
businesses that routinely used material that had fallen out of copyright
protection and fallen in to the public domain challenged the increase as
outside the power of Congress.89 The plaintiff’s argument was that the
extension, and the history of continuing the extension, created unlimited
copyright protection, where Article I grants Congress the power to protect
intellectual property “for limited Times.”90 The Court reviewed the text
of the Constitution, particularly the term “for limited Times,” and
determined that the extension still had an end; thus making the term
limited and within the power granted in Article I.91
It is perhaps more common for the Court to have to look beyond the
text of the Constitution to the breadth and interpretation of that text; in
particular, the Court repeatedly has had to mark boundaries on
constitutional powers. One prevalent example throughout history is the
debate on the scope of the Commerce Clause.92 For approximately two
hundred years, the Supreme Court consistently expanded the scope of
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause.93 In 1824, the Supreme
Court heard its first major Commerce Clause case.94 In Gibbons v.
Ogden, the Court faced a conflict between a federal agency giving
exclusive rights to navigate the waters between New York and New
Jersey and the same rights being given to someone by the state of New
York.95 Once the Court resolved that the navigation between the two
state boundaries would be commerce among the states, the Court held
that the federal power to regulate commerce among the states preempts
the state ability to also do so.96
In what may be seen as the ultimate expansion of the Commerce
Clause powers, during World War II, the Supreme Court held that a
farmer could be fined for consuming wheat grown on his own farm
because the sum total of the wheat consumed and the wheat sold by the
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003).
Id. at 186.
Id. at 192-93.
Id. at 193.
Id. at 198.
Id. at 199-207.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1.
Id. at 1-3.
Id. at 221.
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farmer exceeded federal regulations limiting the production of wheat.97
Arguments that the wheat consumption was purely local in nature and not
interstate commerce failed; as the Court stated:
The commerce power is not confined in its exercise to the
regulation of commerce among the states. It extends to those
activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or
the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make
regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a
legitimate end, the effective execution
of the granted power
to regulate interstate commerce . . . .98
Following Wickard, it appeared that Congress had expansive power
under the Commerce Clause so long as a hypothetical impact on interstate
commerce could be found.99 It was not until 1995 that the Supreme Court
surprised Congress (and legal scholars) when it found that the Gun Free
School Zone Act (“GFSZA”) exceeded that power.100 Given the Court’s
history of expanding the power, Congress could not have known, or
guessed for that matter, that the Supreme Court would not find the
GFSZA within the Commerce power. Within the next five years, the
Court used similar reasoning to hold portions of the Violence Against
Women Act unconstitutional.101
However, in 2005, the Court considered whether the Controlled
Substances Act (“CSA”) exceeded Congress’s power under the
Commerce Clause as applied to the intrastate use and cultivation of
marijuana.102 In Gonzales v. Raich, the Court noted that the “similarities
between this case and Wickard are striking.”103 The Court went on to find
that there was an established illegal market for the drugs, and that the
purpose of the CSA was to regulate that market by manipulating supply
and demand.104 As such, Congress was regulating commerce, albeit
illegal commerce, in passing the CSA; therefore, the Act fell within the
powers of Congress.105 In the dissent, Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, noted that the role of the Court is
to adequately define the powers of Congress to protect the ability of the
states to govern in the traditional spheres of health and welfare.106 Based
97

Wickard, 317 U.S. at 130-31.
Id. at 124 (citing United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)).
99 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 261-71 (holding that the Civil Rights Act of
1964 was a valid exercise of the Commerce Power, without any indication that the Congress
relied on the Commerce Power when drafting, discussing and passing the act).
100 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
101 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627.
102 Raich, 545 U.S. at 5.
103 Id. at 18.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 26.
106 Id. at 42-43 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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on her reading of precedent, Justice O’Connor argued that the activity in
the case, was beyond the reach of federal regulation.107 However, Justice
O’Connor’s analysis did not prevail and the outer limit of the Commerce
Clause power remains in a state of flux.108
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has indicated that it will give
great deference to an act of Congress and presume constitutionality
absent clear evidence of a constitutional violation. For example, in
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, Justices O’Connor and
Stevens reaffirmed that the Court has an obligation to avoid addressing
questions of constitutionality when possible.109 In quoting earlier cases
the Justices stated, “[w]hen the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn
in question, and . . . a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided.”110 This concept of constitutional avoidance further demands
that the Court not address a constitutional issue unless it is necessary.
Chief Justice Roberts, dissenting in the Boumediene v. Bush, noted, “[o]ur
precedents have long counseled us to avoid deciding . . . hypothetical
questions of constitutional law. . . . This is a ‘fundamental rule of judicial
restraint.’”111 A lack of analysis by the President and the Congress may
lead to a necessary interpretation or analysis of constitutional issues that
could otherwise be avoided. This, in addition to the unfounded deference,
creates unnecessary work and a risk of constitutional absenteeism.
The principle of constitutional avoidance is based on the assumption
that the members of Congress are constitutionally aware and are
upholding their oath.112 However, Professor Eastman, director of The
Claremont Institute Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, argues that
Congress is ignoring the issues with constitutional authority because that
authority belongs to the courts.113 However, according to Professor
Eastman, the courts also are ignoring the issue to some extent, through
deference to the Congress. As such, neither the courts nor Congress is
really protecting or defending the constitution.114
Recently, in
Boumediene, the Court supported this supposition by stating, “[t]he usual
Id. at 51 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 42 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
109 McConnell v. Fed. Election Commn., 540 U.S. 93, 180 (2003), overruled by Citizens
United v. Fed. Election Commn., 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
110 Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62, (1932)); see also Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 331, (1988); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982).
111 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2281 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
112 Eastman, supra note 65.
113 Eastman, supra note 65, at 736.
114 Eastman, supra note 65, at 736.
107
108
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presumption is that Members of Congress, in accord with their oath of
office, considered the constitutional issue and determined the amended
statute to be a lawful one; and the Judiciary, in light of that determination,
proceeds to its own independent judgment on the constitutional question
when required to do so in a proper case.”115 Justice Scalia, in dissent
noted, “We have frequently stated that we owe great deference to
Congress’s view that a law it has passed is constitutional.”116
The problem created by this deference is that the Court essentially
gives Congress permission to not perform any constitutional analysis.
There are at least two potential solutions to this problem. First, the
Supreme Court could apply a less deferential standard to legislation
passed by Congress and signed by the President. This option still relieves
the Congress and the President from their duties and oaths. Second, and
preferably, Congress could more clearly enunciate its constitutional
analysis and the President could then either concur or disagree with that
analysis. To achieve this result, either the Court could attempt to force
Congress to apply constitutional analysis, setting up a battle between the
branches, or Congress could self-regulate, and apply constitutional
analysis on its own accord. During the last twenty years, Congress has
occasionally attempted to address these issues through legislation – either
attempting to change the authority of the president or attempting to
increase accountability of the Congress.
IV. LEGISLATIVE INTERVENTIONS IN THE EVALUATION PROCESS
Congress has attempted to address concerns over constitutional
analysis and the legislative process on a number of occasions. In one
instance Congress attempted to give the President more legislative power
through the line-item veto.117 Congress also tried to limit the executive
power to influence constitutional interpretation by banning federal courts
from using Presidential signing statements as a source of constitutional
analysis.118 Finally, Congress repeatedly has attempted to increase its
own accountability by requiring each bill to articulate the specific source
of authority in the Constitution.119 This section looks briefly at each of
115

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2243.
Id. at 2296 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 436, 442-448 (1998). Though the Court did not rule on this
specific issue, the Court did note that they received extensive information on the issue of
delegating legislative power to the President.
118 See S. 1747, 110th Cong. (2007). An identical bill was introduced to the House of
Representatives on October 10, 2007.
119 See H.R. 292, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1018, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 175, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R. 384, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2458, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1359,
110th Cong. (2007), H.R. 450, 111th Cong. (2009), H.R. 125, 112th Cong. (2011), H.R. 109,
116
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these attempts.
A. The Line Item Veto Act
In an attempt to avoid full vetoes by the President, an early
intervention to the current process entailed the creation of the line item
veto, where the President could essentially divide legislation presented to
him or her and “sign” particular sections.120 The line item veto principle
stemmed from an argument between the executive and legislative
branches of the government related to the appropriation of funds by
Congress and the refusal of the executive branch to spend those funds.121
According to legislative history, President Jefferson first refused to spend
monies allocated by Congress, asserting that the executive branch has
some discretion in executing the laws passed by Congress.122 In April
1996, Congress passed, and President Clinton signed, the Line Item Veto
Act officially authorizing this veto process.123 This statute allowed the
President to negate or modify three types of legislative action after
signing the bill into law: dollar amounts for any item that is considered
discretionary spending by the executive branch, the dollar amount of any
new direct spending, or any temporary tax benefits passed by
Congress.124 After President Clinton invoked the line item veto to cancel
several provisions of two different bills, several organizations filed a suit,
asking the court to declare the Line Item Veto Act unconstitutional.125 In
1998, the United States Supreme Court did so, stating that the process
was in direct conflict with the presentment powers as outlined in Article
I, Section 7.126 According to the Court, allowing the President to modify
113th Cong. (2013) and S. 109, 114th Cong. (2015). Senate bills also were introduced in the
110th, 111th, 112th and 113th Congress. See S.3159, 110th Cong. (2007), S.1319, 111th
Cong. (2009), S. 1248, 112th Cong. (2011) and S. 1404, 113th Cong. (2013). The bill has
been cosponsored over time by as few as 34 Representatives and as many as 73. In 2008, for
the first time, an identical bill was introduced in the Senate with 23 sponsors. See S. 3159,
110th Cong. (2008). This bill was introduced by Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma with 22
co-sponsors. In all, the sponsors represent 18 different states.
120 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 420-21.
121 S. COMM. ON THE BUDGET, LEGISLATIVE LINE ITEM VETO ACT, Government Printing
Office, S. REP. NO. 104-10, at 6 (1995), available at https://www.congress.gov/104/crpt
/srpt10/CRPT-104srpt10.pdf.
122 Id. at 2.
123 Clinton, 524 U.S. at 420-21.
124 Id. at 436.
125 Id. at 425-26. Immediately after the Line Item Veto was passed, several members of
Congress who had voted against it also filed suit to have it declared unconstitutional. The
Supreme Court held that the members of Congress did not have standing to sue. Id. at 421.
This second case was brought by hospitals, cities, unions and farming cooperatives who
alleged harm by the veto of the specific provisions.
126 Id. at 421.
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or negate sections of a statute gave the President legislative authority. 127
The constitution limits the President’s legislation-related powers to
presenting to Congress for consideration and either signing or vetoing
legislation presented to him or her after passing the legislative process.128
The Line Item Veto Act was declared unconstitutional because it allowed
the President to modify or negate parts of legislation already enacted in
to law by signature.129 The appropriate method for handling such issues
is for the President to veto the entire piece of legislation while sending a
statement to Congress with the reasons for the veto, outlining the
constitutional concerns and inviting Congress to either correct or delete
those concerns and resubmit the bill.
B. The Presidential Signing Statements Act
On June 29, 2007, Senator Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania introduced
S. 1747: The Presidential Signing Statements Act of 2007.130 In this bill
Senator Specter referred to the Article I, Section 7 power of the President
to either sign or veto a bill.131 He then noted that several presidents have
issued signing statements to accompany their signature of a bill.132
Senator Specter then postulated that courts have used these signing
statements as a source of authority in interpreting the Acts of Congress. 133
He argued that this use of signing statements is problematic for several
reasons. First, because it is merely the opinion of the President, it does
not have the authority as a source of interpretation.134 In addition, the use
of signing statements by courts is neither consistent nor predictable,
creating great uncertainty in the interpretation of the statutes.135 After
reciting the problems with the use of signing statements, the bill
definitively forbid the use of any presidential signing statement by federal
or state courts as a source of authority in determining whether an act of
Congress is constitutional.136 The bill also required courts to allow
Congress to participate in any case regarding the constitutionality of a
statute for which a presidential signing statement was issued to clarify the
127

Id. at 438.
Clinton, 524 U.S. at 438.
129 Id. at 448.
130 S. 1747, 110th Cong. (2007). An identical bill was introduced to the House of
Representatives on October 10, 2007. That bill was referred to the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties.
131 S. 1747 § 2, ¶ 1.
132 Id. ¶¶ 2-3.
133 Id. ¶ 4.
134 Id. ¶ 5.
135 Id. ¶ 6.
136 S. 1747 § 4.
128
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Congressional perspective on the question.137 In sum, the bill requires
that Congress be allowed to justify its passage of a statute. The bill was
referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and never came forth.138
C. The Enumerated Powers Act – A Lesson in Accountability and
Transparency
In 1997, Arizona representative John Shadegg introduced a bill
entitled The Enumerated Powers Act.139 This legislation has been
introduced during each successive Congress; however the bill has
consistently been referred to committee and has expired at the end of each
term of Congress.140 It may be that the committees to which the bill was
referred let it die due to issues requiring more immediate attention. It is
also possible that the committee members did not want to force Congress
to perform a constitutional analysis. Furthermore, members of the
committees have been satisfied with the status quo – letting the court
system bear the burden, responsibility, and power of determining
constitutionality.
The current version of this bill requires that, “Each Act of Congress,
bill and resolution, or conference report thereon or amendment thereto,
shall contain a concise explanation of the specific authority in the
Constitution of the United States relied upon as the basis for enacting
each portion of the measure.”141 The Act itself contains a statement of
constitutional authority.142 Per the author of the bill, the authority comes
from Article 1, Section 5, clause 2 which reads, “Each House may
determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly
137

Id.
Actions Overview of S. 1747, CONGRESS, available at https://www.congress.gov
/bill/110th-congress/senate-bill/1747/all-actions?q={%22search%22%3A[%22
signing+statements%22]}&resultIndex=3.
139 See H.R. 292, 105th Cong. (1997).
140 See H.R. 292, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1018, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 175, 107th
Cong. (2001); H.R. 384, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2458, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1359,
110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 450, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 125, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 109,
113th Cong. (2013); S.109, 114th Cong. (2015). Senate bills also were introduced in the
110th, 111th, 112th and 113th Congress. See S.3159, 110th Cong. (2007); S.1319, 111th
Cong. (2009); S. 1248, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 1404, 113th Cong. (2013). The bill has been
cosponsored over time by as few as 34 Representatives and as many as 73. In 2008, for the
first time, an identical bill was introduced in the Senate with 23 sponsors. See, S. 3159, 110th
Cong. (2008). This bill was introduced by Senator Tom Coburn of Oklahoma with 22 cosponsors. In all, the sponsors represent 18 different states. The current version of the
legislation, S. 109, 114th Cong. (2015) has been referred to the Senate Committee on Rules
and Administration. The current version of the bill was introduced in the Senate by Senator
Dean Heller of Nevada, with no cosponsors.
141 S. 109, 114th Cong. § 102a(a) (2015).
142 Id. § 3.
138
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behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.”143
Unlike prior versions, the current version explicitly states that citation to
the spending clause, the necessary and proper clause, and the general
welfare clause in the Constitution does not satisfy the requirement.144
The current version also prohibits the use of the Commerce Clause for
anything other than the regulation of buying or selling goods or
services.145
A law’s effect as written does not render a bill unconstitutional or
unenforceable without its statement of authority. Instead, it creates a
procedure for lawmakers to force clarification on the authority for the
law. More importantly, if the bill were to pass, and if lawmakers used
the point-of-order procedure, bills would gain transparency and clarity.
This bill would help the President complete his constitutional analysis
before signing and allowing the courts to focus on the scope of powers
rather than relying on legislative history (if it exists) to determine the
source of authority for the bill.
V. THE MOST APPROPRIATE APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS –
THE MORE INFORMATION THE BETTER
With their oaths of office, the President, Justices of the Supreme
Court, and members of Congress vow to preserve, protect, support, and
defend the Constitution.146 A part of that duty should be to interpret and
analyze their actions, as well as the actions of branches where they hold
constitutional checks and balances. This section will look at the
legislative process from start to finish and outline the most transparent
and effective process for informing the analysis.
First, as the legislature works through the legislative writing and
approval process, both the House of Representatives and the Senate may
leave behind a legislative history that demonstrates the issues how they
have been resolved in the past. The requirement of the Enumerated
Powers Act should be in place to help guide interpretations, in addition
to the thoughts of individual members of Congress as a source of analysis.
The passage of The Enumerated Powers Act could result in several
changes in the legislative process, from the introductory discussions on a
bill to the passage and presentment to the President, from the President’s
signature to any evaluation done in the courts. While it is impossible to
know whether the law would impact the number of bills before Congress,
143

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
S. 109, 114th Cong. § 102a(c) (2015).
145 Id.
146 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. The text of each oath is slightly different
but contain same the basic premise.
144
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it is possible that the bills that are before Congress will be more focused.
In addition, the bills will be more transparent for evaluation by the
President and the courts.
The requirement to outline the source of authority for its actions will
indicate to courts, and to the general population, that the members of
Congress are mindful of the limited powers in the Constitution.
Additionally, it also will help focus the courts on the nature of the dispute
– the boundaries of Congressional power under particular clauses of
Article I, Section 8.
Given that Congress often passes enormous bills with multiple
issues in them, there is a risk that the members of Congress will simply
list as many powers as might apply to a massive piece of legislation. The
Enumerated Powers Act, as most recently introduced, requires a “concise
explanation of the specific authority in the Constitution of the United
States relied upon as the basis for enacting each portion of the
measure.”147 In order to be effective, the Enumerated Powers Act should
be amended and passed with two possible provisions. One possible
provision would clarify that massive bills addressing a plethora of issues
under a variety of Congressional powers either is forbidden. Another
possible provision would require that the source of the power for each
different issue be specifically identified in the bill or in an appendix to
the bill. This law has the potential to create a more focused view of the
role of the Congress as its members look for authority for their actions.
These possible provisions would add a clause to the bills may cause
members of Congress to reflect on their own beliefs in our system and
the purpose of the Constitution. As a member votes for a bill, he or she
would be voting not only for the substance of the bill, but also publicly
stating and reaffirming his or her belief in the proper interpretation of the
Constitution. In addition, by declaring the source of authority for the bill,
Congress could focus the contents of the bill to items within that
authority. Bills would become more focused on topic instead of broad
pieces of legislation with multiple issues and pork.148
In enunciating the authority under which actions are taken, Congress
also has an opportunity to shape the Constitution. As courts review laws
there would be an articulated interpretation of the Constitution as opposed
to an assumption that lawmakers considered a law’s constitutionality. If
Congress is thoughtful and long-sighted in its interpretations of the
Constitution, the courts may determine that the reasonable interpretation
147

S. 109, 114th Cong. § 102a(a) (2015).
Pork refers to money spent on pet projects of members of Congress. See Sharyl
Attkisson, Group: Nearly $20B In Pork In Fiscal ‘09, CBS NEWS (Apr. 14, 2009, 6:17 PM), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/14/eveningnews/main4945339.shtml.
148
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is worthy of affirmation. For example, had Congress been more specific
in the legislation discussed in the Morrison case, the court may have been
receptive to discussion that violence against women does indeed impact
commerce. Instead, the Court was forced to look to the unofficial
statements in the legislative history to determine that the Commerce
Clause was the purported power.149 Had Congress specifically stated that
the bill was passed under the Commerce power, the legislative history
would have had even more impact as the Court could look at the
discussions in favor of passing the legislation under the Commerce power
to determine the rationale for the interpretation of that clause. 150 In
addition to the Court having access, The Enumerated Powers Act asks
Congress to be thoughtful about its belief in the purpose and meaning of
the Constitution and to set forth those beliefs where people can find them
and review them. The Act makes Congress’ interpretations more
accessible by requiring that the interpretation be articulated.151
More accessible interpretations do not necessarily mean final
interpretations. Obvious problems would result if Congress were the
final interpreter of the Constitution. First, this situation would render the
concept of the veto nearly useless. Should the President veto legislation
that he or she believes is unconstitutional, Congress would simply reply
that the legislation is constitutional under its interpretation. The
legislation then would stand as legitimate. The impact on the judiciary
would be similar; if the courts found a law unconstitutional, Congress
would just reply that it is constitutional because they articulated their
power for passing it. Under this hypothetical scheme where Congress has
ultimate authority to determine the scope of its own power, the courts
never could declare legislation passed by Congress as unconstitutional.
As soon as a court would declare a statute unconstitutional, the Congress
simply asserts that the majority of the Congress interpreted the
Constitution so that the legislation was constitutional and the courts
would be overruled. Even stranger, if the Congress puts forth in the
legislation a statement that the legislation is within its own interpretation
of its powers, then no court could even entertain a challenge. Further
concerns exist as to the desirability of a political body to be the final
interpreter – as each election creates turnover in seats and possibility in
control, the interpretation of the constitution could change. These
149

Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
Because Senators or Representatives would have discussed the constitutional power
as part of the debate on the legislation, arguments that the legislation was a legitimate use of
the Commerce power would have persuaded at least a majority of the floor and thus could be
seen as more legitimate than mere statements that the law might be legitimate under certain
powers.
151 S. 109, 114th Cong. § 102a(a) (2015).
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problems also exist should the President be seen as the final interpreter.
Second, as the President receives legislation from Congress, he or
she must sign the bill into law or veto it and send it back to the Congress
for further consideration.152 Should the President sign the legislation
without comment, one may be able to assume that the President
acknowledges that the legislation is within the stated powers of Congress
and that the President agrees with the Congress on its interpretation of the
breadth of that power. The President could go further and declare
agreement with the Congressional interpretation of its powers and
endorse the activity as a constitutional activity.
In the case of a veto, the President is constitutionally required to
inform Congress of the reasons for the veto.153 If the reason is related to
constitutional interpretation, the President should clearly articulate how
his or her interpretation may differ from that of Congress, especially if
the power is specifically set forth in the legislation per the Enumerated
Powers Act. If the bill contains provisions that the President does not
believe are constitutional, then the President should feel free to so note,
even if he or she signs the bill in to law. The President could continue
the recent trend and sign legislation with a signing statement that
indicates where the President feels that Congress may have gone beyond
its power or clarifications on how the President intends to interpret the
legislation so that it does not go beyond the powers of Congress. Again
in this situation the President would have the specific clause in the bill to
address the powers of Congress. The President then should be able to set
the priorities of the executive branch, which may include a decreased
priority to prosecute and enforce laws for which the President has
expressed constitutional concerns. Regardless of the President’s
position, any statement on the constitutionality would give the Supreme
Court at least two official declarations of interpretation as opposed to the
current system where the Court relies primarily on precedent and
academic discussions from law review articles.154
Just as Congressional power to enunciate the final interpretation of
constitutional powers would negate certain presidential powers, final
interpretation by the President would virtually negate the veto override.
Once a president determined that the legislation was unconstitutional, and
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U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
Id.
154 On January 21, 2009, one day after being inaugurated, President Obama signed an
Executive Order related to the releasing of the records of prior presidents, making them easier
to access and setting forth a process for prior presidents to object. See Exec. Order No. 13,489,
3 C.F.R. 13489 (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the
_press_office/ExecutiveOrderPresidentialRecords/.
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vetoed the legislation, Congress would be powerless to override the veto.
Even if the super-majority voted to override, the legislation would still be
deemed unconstitutional because of the President’s role as final
interpreter. Like the legislative concerns over politics, presidential
interpretation is highly subject to politics. First term presidents may
interpret the Constitution in light of the impact on reelection. Since
elections are every four years, it is questionable whether constitutional
stability would exist. Without being the final interpreter, the President
still would have an opportunity to influence the discussions about the
Constitution in the courts.
Finally, when a law is challenged, the federal judges and Justices
have the authority to interpret the Constitution.155 Judges and Justices
should be allowed to use any resources at their disposal to guide them in
their understanding and interpretation of the law. The proper death of the
Presidential Signing Statements Act supports this notion.156 Judges and
Justices should look to legislative history to determine the intent of
Congress in passing the legislation, the comments of the President in any
signing statement, and secondary sources such as the discussions and
interpretations offered by legal academics and others in academic
publications. Using all of the resources available will assist the judiciary
in analyzing the scope of any disagreement about the constitutionality of
a statute and address more robustly the arguments as judges and Justices
make their final interpretations.
Having these declarations from the legislative and executive
branches could result in cleaner opinions and more open discussion about
the purpose and meaning of the Constitution. Judges analyzing the
constitutionality of statutes would have a starting point in the text of the
legislation itself. The courts could look directly at the source of authority
under which Congress was purporting to pass legislation and focus on the
scope of that power. The judicial discussion would focus not on whether
Congress had authority to pass the legislation at all, but whether Congress
misinterpreted the Constitution in analyzing the constitutional provision.
The Enumerated Powers Act does not attempt to change the Court’s
ability to interpret the Constitution.157 For example, in Morrison, the
Congress broadly identified Article I, Section 8, as the source of its
authority to pass the Violence Against Women Act.158 In subsequent
lawsuits, the lawyers for the United States and the lower courts looked to
155

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
See supra Part IV.B.
157 S. 109, 114th Cong. § 102a(a) (2015). This requires Congress to articulate its authority
but the bill does not state that the courts must accept that articulation.
158 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
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legislative history to determine that Congress meant the Commerce
Clause as its source of authority.159 Had the Congress been more specific,
as the Enumerated Powers Act would require, the lawyers and Courts
would not have had to even go to the legislative history to determine
which power Congress was purporting to exercise. Instead, the courts
could begin with the heart of the argument – whether Congress correctly
interpreted the breadth and scope of that power. In Morrison, the Court
first had to identify the Commerce Clause and then move to the
discussion where it found that the Congressional interpretation of the
Commerce power was incorrect.160 The Court specifically pointed to the
appearance that Congress was so broadly defining interstate commerce to
include all activity as interstate commerce so that the federal government
would become the sole regulating body. 161 The crux of the Court’s
opinion is that Congress misinterpreted the Commerce Clause to allow
the passage of the Violence Against Women Act and that the Court was
clarifying the boundaries of the power.162 This role of the court was not
changed because Congress had set forth, at least generally, evidence that
a constitutional analysis had occurred.
Given that there is room for disagreement in interpretation of the
Constitution, the final question to answer is the question of finality or
supremacy. Though in the early days of our nation it was not clear that
any branch should be a final interpreter, the Court’s role has been to
provide final interpretation to the provisions of the Constitution.163 Given
the problems discussed above with giving the executive and legislative
branch final authority, it should remain clear that the Court is still the
proper place for finality.
Since federal judges and Supreme Court Justices are appointed for
life, they are able to focus on the Constitution and its meanings more
easily than those who are more susceptible to the political will of the
people. In addition, because the Justices hold their appointments
typically for longer than Presidents or a majority of legislatures, the
philosophies and interpretations are likely to change slower than if
elected officials were the final interpreters.164 As Alexander Hamilton
said in the seventy-eighth Federalist Paper, “It is far more rational to
suppose that the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between
159

Id.
Id. at 607-19.
161 Id. at 614.
162 Id. at 627.
163 See Segall, supra note 6.
164 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Marbury, Marshall and the Politics of Constitutional
Judgment, 89 VA. L. REV. 1203, 1228 n.14 (2003) (postulating that even when the Court is
political, its politics differ greatly from those of elected officials).
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the people and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the
latter within the limits assigned to their authority [than to assume that the
legislature should be the constitutional judge of its own actions].”165
Hamilton further pointed out that the role of the judge is to interpret the
law and that the constitution is a “fundamental law.”166 The Court would
be better able to focus on interpretation if the Congress is more specific
with its statements of authority and if the President is clear in his support
or disagreement with those statements.
VI. CONCLUSION
The political and judicial leaders of our nation have sworn to uphold,
protect, support, and defend the Constitution of the United States. As
such, each branch of government has a responsibility to ensure that the
actions taken are within the bounds of constitutional authority. This is
not always an easy task as the number of laws declared unconstitutional
may show.167 It is often broad in language and leaves room for
interpretation. Because of this, each branch has a duty to perform an
analysis and interpret the Constitution in a transparent way. The passage
of the Enumerated Powers Act will increase transparency at the
Congressional level. The use of signing statements by the President to
share his or her interpretation also will inform the courts and the public
about the posture of the executive branch toward the breadth of the
constitutional powers. Finally, the use of this information by the courts,
with the ultimate authority of the courts to adopt, modify, or reject the
interpretation of either Congress or the President, will create a more
transparent and balanced discussion about the meaning of the
Constitution.
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THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills ed., 1982).
Id. See also, Samuel R. Olken, The Ironies of Marbury v. Madison and John
Marshall’s Judicial Statesmanship, 37 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 391, 408 (2004).
167 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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